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Abstract. Flood risk management in United Kingdom has been going through a process of rapid change in the last 
decade or so, no doubt spurred on by a series of very serious floods since the year 2000.  These changes affect flood 
defence and non-structural flood risk management measures alike, and involve a degree of devolution from central 
government to local communities and regional organisations, as central government seeks to shed responsibilities for 
policy implementation.  This paper discusses three case studies concerning flood defence, property level protection, 
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approaches to social justice.  The results show a different pattern in each area, with flood defence moving somewhat 
towards a Rawlsian approach, but flood insurance and property level protection showing signs of both inefficiency 
and poor penetration, respectively, particularly with regard to low income residents, especially those in social 
housing. 
1 Introduction  
Those concerned to manage and hence reduce flood 
risk commonly have aspirations to be fair, and treat all 
those at risk and contributing to risk reduction equally in 
an open and transparent way that maximises social well-
being and solidarity, in the face of both risks now and 
risks into the future. Such aims are often articulated in 
policy documents, Government statements and through 
the work of Non-Governmental Organisations.  They also 
involve consideration of relevant populations both during 
flood events, in the recovery period afterwards, and 
through the investment of state and private resources 
targeted at risk reduction measures, both engineering and 
non-engineering. 
In this paper these issues are discussed with regard to 
three examples. First, we look at investment in traditional 
flood risk management (FRM) measures in the UK, and 
the impact they have on deprived and non-deprived 
communities. This appears to show a marked shift in 
attention towards the former, and away from the latter, as 
government investment is targeted at those areas of 
financial deprivation which are also at flood risk.  This is 
not an absolutely clear picture, because at the same time 
the government is prioritizing investment in a major 
scheme to the west of London, the Thames Scheme, 
where substantial investment has been given without 
consideration, it would appear, to the social composition 
of the area and its relative affluence. 
Secondly, we looked at flood risk management for 
those in social housing and the provision of property-
level-protection measures. Such measures are 
unaffordable to those on low incomes in social housing, 
yet this is one policy option that is being promulgated 
widely in the absence of sufficient government funds for 
major flood risk reduction measures of the traditional 
kind.  Leaving those who are already vulnerable to seek 
protection from their own resources appears to be a 
perverse policy, with few chances of significant success. 
Thirdly, we look at recovery and insurance that 
promotes recovery, and a new proposal in the UK to 
subsidise flood insurance (through the reinsurance 
arrangement termed Flood Re), even for those occupying 
very large houses which are worth considerable sums of 
money.  The whole question of subsidising flood 
insurance is an important one in justice terms, because it 
means a cross subsidy from those not at risk to those at 
risk (or from those at low risk to those at high risk), and 
this has become more transparent recently owing to 
government policies to make flood insurance affordable 
and available to anyone, even those at high risk. 
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Figure 1.   Current and future spending on flood and coastal defence against the latest assessment of need as 
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Table 1.   The payment rates for the Partnership Funding arrangement (Source: from [6]) 
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Outcome 
Measure (OM) 
Qualifying outcomes/benefits Payment rate 
OM1 
Present value of the whole life benefits of the 
current proposed investment, less benefits or 
payments associated with the outcome measures 
below. 
£0.556 per £1.00 of qualifying 
benefit (i.e. 5.56%) 
 
OM2 
The number of households protected against flood 
risk: 
 
In the 20% most deprived areas £0.45 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 21% to 40% most deprived areas £0.30 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 60% least deprived areas £0.20 per £1.00 of benefit 
 
OM3 
The number of households better protected against 
coastal erosion 
 
In the 20% most deprived areas £0.45 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 21% to 40% most deprived areas £0.30 per £1.00 of benefit 
In the 60% least deprived areas £0.20 per £1.00 of benefit 
OM4 
Statutory environmental obligations:  
Hectares of water-dependent habitat created or 
protected 
£15,000 per hectare 
Hectares of inter-tidal habitat created £50,000 per hectare 
Kilometres of protected river improved £80,000 per km of river bed 
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However, two broad characteristics of social housing 
units limit the ability of their occupants to engage with 
the flood risk management policies, in particular the 
widely advocated policy of encouraging property-level-
protection measures (PLP). This policy seeks to transfer 
the responsibility of flood protection to the residents 
themselves, for example through their implementation of 
coping mechanisms (e.g. moving belongings), immediate 
adaptations (e.g. using sandbags), or future adaptations 
(e.g. raising the height of the front door threshold) to 
cope with flood risk [14].
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Whilst a policy stipulating increased tenant 
responsibility for their flood risk is in theory an effective 
manner to increased flood preparedness for the UK at a 
low cost to the government, it is only effective if the 
tenants themselves engage with this policy. To ask social 
housing residents who are often the most deprived 
individuals in the country to engage with this policy, as 
though they are equally prepared and able to as those who 
are much more capable and affluent, shows a severe lack 
of understanding towards the concept of differentiated 
vulnerability. Given their characteristic limited income 
and educational levels, and the confused status of 
autonomy of residents in social housing, it is likely this 
policy will have limited chance of success.
Transformational adaptations, which are more 
significant actions like moving housing to avoid the flood 
risk [18], are unlikely to be supported by the government 
or by the tenants themselves given the strict allocation 
criteria for social housing which means that moving to 
   
  
 		  	
offered affordable state or housing association promoted 
housing.
5 Flood insurance post 2016 in the UK 
Flood insurance is near universal in the UK, provided 
by private companies [19]. But from April 2016 the UK 
   !	 " # 
implemented into UK law by the Water Act 2014 [20] 
and additional Regulations [21], has the aim of promoting 
the continued availability and affordability of insurance 
premiums in flood risk areas. Flood Re applies a 
(graduated) premium cap to household policies thereby 
limiting the amount paid by an individual for flood 
insurance. Insurers then cede these policies into the Flood 
Re scheme and any flood losses that occur are paid from 
the industry-wide pool.  The £180m annual funding for 
the pool is generated from the premium income of those 
properties entered and also from a levy which is included 
on all domestic flood insurance policies, which are now 
formally subsidising the insurance of properties in high 
flood risk areas.  Flood Re is only meant to be in place 
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for the next 25 years, supposedly to give both the 
government and households time to reduce flood risk.  
Over this period, it is proposed that the capped premiums 
will increase, thereby phasing out the cross-subsidy and 
returning flood insurance to a purely market based 
situation [22]. 
Flood Re raises a number of social justice issues.  The 
first relates to which properties are eligible.  Only private 
households are included [23]; businesses are not 
included, nor landlords with multiple properties, so that 
most leasehold properties are excluded  New properties 
built after 1st January 2009 are also excluded, to 
recognise that a critical component of UK FRM is to 
prevent the increase of flood risk. But problems relating 
to flood risk awareness and disclosure may mean the 
burden is passed to unsuspecting homeowners, rather 
than remaining with developers, who retain no liability. 
Maintaining the affordability (and availability) of 
flood insurance appears to be a positive step, but there is 
the question of who benefits.  Flood Re is specifically 
designed to assist those householders with high premiums 
for flood cover and as such it is only these households in 
higher risk areas that benefit: those at higher flood risk 
are being subsidised by those at low or no flood risk. 
 	
 
		 	 $	
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   


implementation, Flood Re has formalised this 
relationship and Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe [24] raise 
questions about the fairness of the approach. 
Within the approach there is little consideration of the 
ability to pay for flood insurance as a criterion for 
receiving premium assistance.  The way in which Flood 
Re caps premiums and distributes the risk amongst all 
policyholders means that low income households who are 
not at risk are cross-subsidising high income, at-risk 
households who could very probably afford the risk-
reflective price. The capped premiums do show some 
graduation according Council Tax property value 
%ands&	""
' and those residents in lower 
value properties pay less for their insurance than those in 
more expensive properties.  Low value Band A 
properties would pay £210 towards the flood component 
of a combined flood policy, whereas a mid-Band 
E property has a premium cap of £330. This is acting as 
very crude proxy for whether a property owner may be 
able to afford to pay.  However, this graduation is in part 
related to the additional cover required by more 
expensive larger properties: any claims will be higher. 
Original plans for Flood Re excluded the most expensive 
1% of properties (Band H), recognising that these 
occupants should not subsidised [25]. However, the 
scheme as implemented did include these properties, 
although the capped premium is more than double the 
next lowest band at £1200 [26, 27], but it would be 
considerably higher without the subsidy. Furthermore, 
Flood Re does nothing to address the wider issues of 
affordability of insurance and there has not been the 
inclusion of any mechanism to enable those who are not 
able to afford any kind of insurance to access flood cover. 
A counter to these social justice concerns is that Flood 
Re is only intended to be a transitional arrangement and 
that over time this cross-subsidy will be removed, at least 
for the higher value properties. However, the first 
transitional plan [22] provides few details about how the 
removal of the cross-subsidy will work in practice. For 
instance, unless flood premiums are able to be lowered 
due to risk reduction measures it is likely that 
affordability will remain a key issue and may lead to a 
reduction in insurance penetration.  Additionally, as 
indicated above, those on lower incomes are less likely to 
be able to afford to take proactive PLP measures to adopt 
risk reduction measures, as well as being less likely to be 
able to afford higher premiums with the transition to risk-
related premiums [28, 29]. Therefore, unless there is 
government intervention either better to enable 
disadvantaged households to adopt flood mitigation, or 
the cross-subsidy continues for these low income 
households after the proposed end of the scheme, it is 
likely that greater numbers of properties will become 
uninsured in the future, occupied by those less able to 
afford to recover from flooding. 
6 Assessment and conclusions 
The last decade has seen very significant changes in 
flood risk management policy in the UK [30].  Many of 
these changes have been directly or indirectly a result of 
severe flooding in 2000, 2007, 2013/14 and 2015/16.  
Policy changes have affected both the non-structural and 
the structural dimensions of flood risk management 
measures, as the government and other stakeholders have 
seen the necessity to react to a change in flood risk 
regime and to a financial state of affairs whereby 
governments are seeking to restrain their expenditure in 
this area, given the reluctance to raise taxes and extreme 
budgetary pressures elsewhere, for example from the 
health sector. 
The essence of the changes flood risk management 
policy has been to devolve responsibility to local and 
regional actors, including individual households, rather 
than central government being the prime mover for risk 
reduction. 
There are some contradictory elements with regard to 
social justice and fairness in this respect, as characterised 
by our three examples discussed above.  Flood defence 
expenditure appears to be moving towards quite an 
implicit Rawlsian approach, at least in part, giving a 
distinct advantage to protecting householders in 
financially deprived areas and making the 
implementation of large flood risk management measures 
in more affluent areas difficult to fund. 
On the other hand property level protection measures 
undertaken by individuals in social housing - also 
characteristic of socially and economically deprived 
locations ( appears to be completely neglected, thus 
adding to the vulnerability of the occupants and 
restricting their ability to recover from flood events. 
At the same time, the new Flood Re proposals for 
flood insurance continue to subsidise for the next 25 
years those householders living in floodplain areas, 
including subsidising those almost certainly well able to 
afford market prices for the premiums they pay for the 
cover provided.  The scheme also appears to continue to 
create a distinct disincentive for individual householders 
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who have their insurance subsidised in this way to reduce 
the risk they face by taking some actions themselves. 
Both the social housing and the flood insurance 
situations are distinctly non-Rawlsian in character, but 
nor are they egalitarian, nor necessarily utilitarian.  
Indeed, the flood insurance proposals cannot be seen as 
utilitarian since they are not characterised by the search 
for efficiency that that philosophy espouses: the latest 
assessment of Flood-Re suggests that its net present value 
is negative [31, 32]!  The most charitable view of the 
situation with regard to social housing is that it has not 
been considered a significant flood risk management 
issue in the past, rather than the situation being 
deliberately designed to penalize those living in such 
locations.  Whilst we recognise that flooding itself is not 
	 
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 	  
population [2], movements in the policy arena that 
exacerbate rather than minimise unfairness would not 
seem to be a sustainable or sensible way forward. 
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